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Voting Rules in International Organizations
Eric A. Posner and Alan 0. Sykes*

Abstract
International organi.ations use a bewildering variey of voting rules-with diferent
thresholds, weighting systems, veto points, and other rules that distribute influence unequally
among participants.We provide a briefsurvey of the major voting systems, and show that all
are controversialand unsatisfactory in vaious ways. While it is tempting to blame greatpowers
or the weakness of international law for these problems, we argue that the root source is
intellectual rather than political-the diJficuly of designing a voting system that both allows
efficient collective decisions andprotects the legitimate interests of members. We show how a new
type of voting system-quadratic voting-could in theory resolve these problems, and while it
may be too new or unusual to implement any time soon, itprovides insights into the defects of
the existing systems.
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International organizations-international institutions that are established
by states to perform functions on their behalf-make collective decisions using
a diverse array of voting rules. Some organizations, like the World Trade
Organization' and the Council of the International Seabed Authority2, act (at
least on some matters) by unanimity rule or consensus. Others, like the Human
Rights Council,' act by majority rule. International courts of various sorts-from
the International Court of Justice' to the International Criminal Court-also
make decisions by majority rule. The World Bank6 and the International
Monetary Fund' use majority rule plus weighted voting, where some countries
may cast more votes than others. Supermajority rule is also common, frequently
used by various European decision making bodies. And some voting systems are
even more complex, combining different features. For example, the Security
Council operates with a three-fifths supermajority rule while the five permanent
members have vetoes.' Numerous other variations exist.
What accounts for the variety of voting rules? International institutions are
established to serve the interests of member countries. They are considered
necessary in the first place because of transaction or decision costs: only with
great difficulty can countries negotiate resolutions to problems, and if all
countries must agree to a solution to every problem or conflict that arises, any
single country can hold out for a better deal. But once an international
institution exists, it may act contrary to the interests of its members or of some
of its members. A particular concern is that one group of countries may use an
institution to harm another group of countries or a particular country.
An optimal institution will, in the language of economics, maximize surplus
for its members-the institution should produce (ex ante) efficient outcomes by

1
2

See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. IX, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 UNTS 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, § 3 of Annex,Jul. 28,1994, availableat http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/332/98/PDF/N9433298.pdf [hereinafter Seabed
Authority Agreement].

17, UN

3

See GA Res. 60/251,

4

See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art. 55, Jun. 26, 1945 59 Stat. 1031, 33 UNTS 993
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].

5

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 74, Jul. 7, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, art. V,
§ 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 UNTS 134 [hereinafter IBRD Agreement].

6

Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).

7

See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. XII, 5 5(c), Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, TIAS No. 1501, 2 UNTS 39 [hereinafter IMF Agreement].

8

U.N. Charter arts. 23, 27.
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maximizing the value of cooperation net of the costs of operating the institution,
including direct decision costs and any costs associated with decisions that
reflect opportunism by a subset of members at the expense of others. Voting
rules must be designed in relation to this objective, but no voting rule is likely to
be ideal. Majority rule, for example, greatly mitigates the hold-out problem by
enabling the majority to outvote the hold-out, thus reducing the incentive to
hold out in the first place. But a majority can also expropriate from the minority,
and the fear of such expropriation may deter countries from agreeing to majority
rule. Countries can address these problems in various ways: by using a
supermajority or unanimity rule, giving vulnerable countries vetoes or weighted
votes, narrowing the scope of the decision making body's authority, limiting
membership to countries with closely aligned interests, and so on. In this paper,
we explore how these considerations shed light on the voting systems used in
international law.
The plan is as follows. Section I provides a brief legal and historical
background. Section II provides a framework for thinking about voting issues in
international organizations. Section III applies this framework to several
examples. Section IV addresses a possible direction of reform based on a recent
proposal by an economist that a voting procedure known as "quadratic voting"
could overcome the problems with existing voting procedures.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Formal international organizations with complex voting structures came
into existence in the twentieth century. Before then, countries normally
cooperated on a bilateral or ad hoc basis, and almost never set up independent
organizations. Countries cooperated diplomatically and entered treaties with
each other. From time to time-usually after conflicts that involved multiple
states-they would send delegates to an international convention in the hope of
either creating a multilateral treaty or (more commonly) a set of understandings
for guiding their future interactions. After the Napoleonic Wars, for example,
countries met in the Congress of Vienna to establish what would become the
Great Powers system of the nineteenth century. Another important conference,
the Congress of Paris, met after the Crimean War in 1856. These conventions
were ad hoc affairs, and their decisions were made by consensus.
The one nineteenth-century institution that resembled modern
international organizations was the arbitration panel. States would on occasion
resolve their disputes by appointing arbitrators and giving them the power to
render a binding judgment. Arbitration panels always had an odd number of
members and decided their cases by majority rule. Like modern international
organizations, arbitration panels received a "delegation" of power from the
states that set them up. Unlike modern international organizations, they were
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established to address a single conflict or issue and then disbanded at the
conclusion of the dispute. Arbitration was used frequently by the United
Kingdom and the United States; by the end of the nineteenth century there had
been efforts, largely unsuccessful, to institutionalize it in permanent bodies.'
The pre-twentieth century aversion to international organizations might be
attributed to the positivism of the time, which held that a state could not be
legally bound without its consent. An international institution that operated by
majority rule could bind a state that is outvoted.,o However, there was no reason
in theory why positivism could not accommodate ex ante consent to an
institution that used majority rule, and indeed the popularity of arbitration
suggests that states could reconcile themselves to majority rule if the gains were
high enough. More likely, states saw little need for complex international
institutions at a time when a handful of great powers could cooperate informally
while holding spheres of influence over much of the world, and international
cooperation was relatively limited.
All this changed in the twentieth century. The turning point was World
War I, which convinced statesmen that countries needed to cooperate more
closely on security issues, and gave rise to the League of Nations." Various more
specialized organizations were founded in its wake, including the International
Labor Organization,12 which was given the task of setting labor standards. The
League of Nations collapsed in the years leading up to World War II, but after
that War countries redoubled their efforts to build international organizations.
The United Nations was created, along with an International Court of Justice,13
and an enormous number of committees, commissions, and councils, which
were given jurisdiction over health, human rights, and related topics. Western
countries created the International Monetary Fund 4 to stabilize exchange rates,
and the World Bank" to finance European reconstruction." They also
negotiated toward the creation of an International Trade Organization, which-

9

See ERic A. POSNER & ALAN 0. SYKES, EcONoMic FOUNDATIONS OF INTE RNATIONAL LAW 96--

10

101 (2012).
See Stephen Zamora, Voting in InternationalEconomicOrganigations,74 AMER.J. INT'L. L. 566 (1980).

11
12

Treaty of Versailles, part 1,Jun. 28, 1919, 225 Consol. TS 189, 195-205.
Id., part VIII.

13

See ICJ Statute, supra note 4.
See IMF Agreement, supra note 7.
See IBRD Agreement, supra note 6.

14
15

16

On the history of the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank), the failed attempt to
negotiate an ITO, and the emergence of GATT, see generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WOR.D TRADIE
AND THE LAW OF GATT (Bobbs-Merrill 1969); Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton Woods AgreementTwentyfive Years After, 23 STAN. L. REv. 235, 256-75 (1971).
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never approved by the US Congress-was supplanted by the earlier General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and later subsumed into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994.17 Other important organizations created
along the way included the International Seabed Authority," the International
Criminal Court," and various European institutions, which were, however,
regional rather than international in scope.
The founders of all of these institutions faced basic questions of
institutional design, including our topic of the voting system. The premise that
all states must consent to all binding decisions was quickly abandoned. Another
legal principle-that of sovereign equality-seemed to suggest that all states
should have an equal vote, and majority rule is often regarded as the fairest way
for groups to make decisions.2 0 But for reasons we will discuss, states did not
consider themselves bound to this system. Instead, they approached the voting
rules in a pragmatic spirit, and hammered out compromises that reflected the
functions of the institutions, the goals of the states, and their relative power.
II. THEORY
States create international organizations to make or facilitate decisions on
their behalf. In some such organizations, a principal or group of principals hire
an agent to perform a task for their benefit because the agent has superior
information, or can gather information, and thereby make better decisions than
the principals can. This framework is perhaps descriptive of the WTO
adjudicative system, relying on arbitral "panels" and an Appellate Body. 21 But it
is not characteristic of all international organizations (or even all aspects of the
WTO). In the United Nations, for example, agents do not make significant
decisions on behalf of member states, or at least not the major member states.
The UN Security Council and certain other international organizations appear to
perform the simpler function of facilitating group decision making by its
members-that is, to save decision or transaction costs. The Security Council
does nothing independently of its members; it is essentially just a venue for the
members to meet coupled with a set of voting rules.22
So let us put aside the information gathering function for now, and
consider a simple setup in which a group of states agree at time one that they

17
18
19
20
21
2

See WTO Agreement, supra note 1.
See Seabed Authority Agreement, supra note 2.
See Rome Statute, supra note 5.

See Zamora, supra note 10.
See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV.
U.N. Charter, supra note 8, arts. 23-32.
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will make decisions according to a certain voting rule at time two and later. As
noted, we assume that the states create the rule to maximize ex ante joint surplus
net of decision-making costs and the costs of opportunistic behavior. Let us
consider two standard rules: unanimity and majority. Under a unanimity rule, all
states must agree to a proposed outcome. The advantage of the unanimity rule is
that the outcome must therefore make all states better off than the status quothe outcome is Pareto-superior.2 3
The disadvantage of the unanimity rule is that decision costs are high. This
results from two distinct problems. First, there will often be a range of decisions
that increase the aggregate welfare of the states (i.e., that are Kaldor-Hicks
efficient 24-they provide gains to the winners that exceed the losses to the
losers) but that do not satisfy the Pareto criterion.25 They may not receive
unanimous support ex post unless transfers are arranged, and it may be
expensive for states to arrange transfers to each other. Yet, from an ex ante
perspective (subject to a qualification below) states typically want Kaldor-Hicks
efficient decisions to be made because they gain from them on average, as long
as they take turns being winners and losers (or an ex ante transfer is arranged to
compensate losers prospectively).
Second, states can hold out under a unanimity rule whether or not they
gain from a prospective decision, demanding a payoff in return for their consent.
But if many or all states hold out, then there will not be enough surplus
generated by the decision to pay all the states off.
Now consider majority rule. The major advantage of majority rule is that
decision costs are low. The states that lose from a Kaldor-Hicks efficient
outcome are simply outvoted; transfers do not need to be arranged. Any state
that threatens to hold out can also be outvoted. But now the problem is that the
majority of states can force through a decision that is Kaldor-Hicks inefficient
and that transfers value from the minority to the majority. This risk of
"exploitation" can make majority rule unattractive form an ex ante perspective:
while decision costs are low, the voting rule permits inefficient outcomes as well
as efficient outcomes, and so may in aggregate have negative net expected value.
One can also pick a rule between majority and unanimity-a supermajority
rule of three-fifths, four-fifths, or whatever. As the supermajority required by a
voting rule increases, the decision costs increase as well (because more states
must agree) but the exploitation costs decline (because fewer states can be
23

See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).

24

See John Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49-196 THE ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositionsin Economics and InterpersonalComparisons of Utility, 49-195 THE ECON. J.
549 (1939).

25

See DREW FUDENBERG &JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 18 (1983).
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outvoted). Buchanan and Tullock conclude that the optimal decision rule
balances decision and exploitation costs, and so will vary according to these
parameters.
But there are other considerations as well that are of special importance in
international relations-above all others, the problem of heterogeneity of
interests. Consider a proposed international organization that includes a number
of like-minded countries, and a minority of outliers. For example, imagine a
regional trade organization that includes seven developing countries and three
developed countries. Suppose further that the developed countries can gain
from entering this organization to the extent that it reduces trade barriers, and
protects their investors from foreign expropriation. All of the countries can gain
ex ante if the rules on expropriation are developed efficiently (so that they
encourage investment and minimize value-reducing expropriation) but the
developing countries could gain ex post if they are allowed to engage in
unconstrained expropriation. At the outset, the rules are not negotiated and the
members simply choose a voting rule for their later adoption.
We can imagine various possible outcomes. The developed countries might
agree to majority rule despite the risk of expropriation because they believe that
the poor countries will not vote for inefficient expropriation (perhaps because
they do not want to deter investment), or that they will do so only in rare
circumstances. At the other extreme, the developed countries might demand a
unanimity rule or a strict supermajority rule (eight-tenths) so that they can block
adverse rules, while in the process giving up some of the decision-cost benefits
of majority rule.
Other deals are possible. The developed countries could be given weighted
votes. For example, they could be given three votes each (so they can always
block the developing countries 9-7) or two votes each (so they can block a
majority of developing countries if they can persuade or bribe one of the
developing countries to take their side). In this way, a developed country has
greater influence over outcomes but cannot veto any outcome that hurts it.
Another possibility is that the developed countries could be given agenda-setting
power, for example, through the exclusive right to initiate proceedings, or
membership on a special body that makes recommendations to a larger body.
Yet another possibility is that certain outcomes or decisions can be ruled offlimits to the body; or the body's power to issue binding rulings or interpretations
may be limited. When we discuss international organizations in Section III, we
will see other examples of rules that protect countries in the presence of
heterogeneous interests.

26

BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 23.
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However, the different rules that we discuss fall short of optimality. The
problem is that the welfare-maximizing decision must take into account both the
fraction of states that benefit from it and the extent of the benefit for each state.
Simple one-state-one-vote systems account for the fraction of states but neglect
the magnitude of the benefit except in the case of unanimity, where states that
are hurt by a decision can block its implementation. Weighted voting can protect
states that systematically care more about outcomes than other states, but cannot
protect a state that happens to care about one decision more than others and is
otherwise no different from the other states. We will return to this problem in
Section IV.
A final issue of considerable importance in international relations is the
problem of enforcement. Because international law is not enforced by external
agents, the decisions of international organizations must be self-enforcing. This
means that the countries, even those that are outvoted, must do better by
complying with a decision ex post than by violating it. In one model by Maggi
and Morelli,27 the voting rules used by international organizations are placed in
the standard repeated-game framework. Outvoted countries comply with
decisions in order to retain the chance of being part of the majority for the next
decision. The major implication of the model is that as the discount factors of
countries decline (and hence the present value of future payoffs declines), they
are less likely to comply with a decision when outvoted, and hence voting rules
must be stronger (more toward a supermajority) in order to be incentive
compatible (and ensure that the members will respect decisions rather than
causing the organization to unravel). Maggi and Morelli argue that their model
helps explain why voting rules in international organizations are often unanimity
or strict supermajority rules.28 Because wealthier, more developed states have
better political institutions than poorer states, and hence are better able to
incorporate future payoffs into present decisions, one would predict based on
this model that organizations involving only rich states will have weaker voting
rules than organizations involving poor states or a mix of rich and poor states.
To sum up, we identify the following factors as playing a role in the
determination of voting rules: (1) decision costs; (2) exploitation costs; (3)
heterogeneity (meaning that some states gain more from collective decisions
than others or lose more from adverse decisions than others); and (4) discount
factors (which of course can be heterogeneous as well). Generally speaking, a
simple one-state-one-vote majority-rule system will become more difficult to
sustain as decision costs decline, exploitation costs increase, heterogeneity
27

Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, Self-Enforcig Voting in International OrganiZations, 96 AMER.

28

ECON. REv. 1137 (2006).
Id. at 1139-40.
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increases, and discount factors decline. But as we have already seen, states
respond to these problems not just by adjusting the size of the majority needed
for a decision; they can also address these problems by adjusting the weight of
votes, restricting membership, manipulating agenda control, restricting the scope
and bindingness of decision-making, and so on.
III. EXAMPLES
A. General Assembly and Security Council
The major organs of the United Nations are the General Assembly and
the Security Council. The General Assembly consists of a delegate from each of
the member states, of which there are currently 193.29 The General Assembly
issues resolutions of concern to the international community but these
resolutions do not have binding legal effect. But it does have some indirect legal
power: it elects most of the members of the Security Council and all of the
members of the International Court of Justice, institutions that can issue legally
binding orders. The Security Council, which has fifteen members, has more
direct legal power: it can issue resolutions that are legally binding on all UN
member states. Of the fifteen countries that have seats on the Security Council,
there are five permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Russia, and China) and ten rotating members.30
The General Assembly uses a simple voting system of majority rule with
one vote per member state. The Security Council uses a hybrid
supermajority/veto system. A resolution is passed if (1) no permanent member
vetoes it; and (2) at least nine members vote in favor of it. This roughly means
that a resolution must have the support of the five permanent members and at
least four of the rotating members.
At the time that the UN system was established, it was believed that the
five permanent members would be the world's policemen-they would use
force to keep the peace. These countries were too powerful to be compelled to
use force by others; and they simply refused to be subject to adverse legal
orders-hence their veto.31 Some commentators feared that unanimity would
lead to gridlock, and a three-fourths rule was briefly considered, but rejected.32
The only question was whether the rule for all members would be majority or
29

3

What Are Member States?, UNITED NATIONs, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/whatisms
.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).

See U.N. Charter, supranote 8, arts. 23-25.

31

See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Counifs First Fft
(1995).

32

RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 246-49 (1958).
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supermajority. At the time, there were to be ten members, so a majority rule
(requiring six) would mean that the consent of only one rotating member would
be necessary to authorize a resolution. Many small countries feared that under
this system the rotating members would have insufficient influence, so
eventually a supermajority rule of seven-tenths was established. When the
Security Council was later expanded to fifteen, that rule became nine-fifteenths.3 3
Thus, fears that the large countries would be compelled to act against their
interest by the majority of small countries led to the veto; and fears that the
small countries (representing by the rotating members) might be bullied by the
large countries led to an additional supermajority requirement. The upshot was
that the UN Security Council had a voting threshold that was very high. It might
have been thought that by keeping membership small, agreements could be
reached by deliberation and consensus. Indeed, there is evidence that the
permanent members (above all, the United States) obtain the votes of rotating
members by paying them off with foreign aid and other benefits.34 But gridlock
was the pattern until the end of the polarization of the Cold War. Even since
1991, the Security Council has had trouble reaching agreement on major issues.
By contrast, the General Assembly has, thanks to majority rule voting,
issued hundreds of resolutions on numerous controversial issues." The history
of the General Assembly illustrates the two features of majority voting that we
have emphasized: (1) that it makes decision-making easy; and (2) it enables the
majority to choose outcomes that the minority of powerful states oppose.
Although the story is complex, at various times poor developing countries have
been able to form blocs that outvoted the powerful countries.36 The powerful
countries effectively anticipated this development and protected their interests
by denying legal power to General Assembly resolutions.
The inadequacies of the voting systems in both the General Assembly and
the Security Council are widely acknowledged." In the General Assembly,

33

GA Res. 1991A (XVIII), UN Doc. A/RES/1991 (Dec. 17, 1963).

3

See, for example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, The Pernicious Consequences of UN
Securiy CouncilMembership, 54 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 667 (2010); Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker,
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? ForeignAid and Bribey at the United Nations, 114 J.
POL. ECON. 905 (2006).

35

36

37

Seefor example, GA Res. 67/19, UN Doc. A/Res/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012) (conferring non-member
observer status on Palestine), and GA Res. 2758 (XXV1) (October 25, 1971) (recognizing the
People's Republic of China as "the only legitimate representative of China to the United
Nations.").
For a brief survey, see Erik Voeten, Data and Anayses of Voting in the UN GeneralAssemby (unpub.
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2111149.
See, for example, Amber Fitzgerald, Security Council Reform: Creating a More Representative Body of the
Entire UN Membership, 12 PACE INT'L L. REv. 319, 328-38 (2000).
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Iceland has a population of 320,000 and China has a population of
1,351,000,000, and yet they have equal voting power. One might think that more
populous countries should have greater voting power than less populous
countries because decisions will affect more people. In the Security Council, it
seems unfair that a single country could block a decision that would benefit all
other countries in the world. Moreover, the five veto-holding permanent
members are no longer the most important or most powerful countries, nor are
they representative of regional interests. France has a population of 66 million
and the UK has a population of 64 million. Numerous other countriesincluding Indonesia (population of 253 million), Brazil (202 million), Germany
(81 million), the Philippines (107 million), India (1.2 billion), Japan (127 million),
Nigeria (177 million), and Pakistan (196 million)-are larger," and several are
richer. 9
Proposals for reform have proliferated.4 0 These reforms include giving the
General Assembly greater power or restructuring the Security Council, so that
more countries belong to it or can exercise the veto. But a larger Security
Council-along with the strict voting rules, which the permanent members will
continue to insist on-will surely increase gridlock, with the result that the
Security Council will be even more ineffectual than it currently is. A weaker
voting rule would help reduce gridlock, but it would open up members to
exploitation at the hands of the majority. Is there a better way?
One proposal that has received some attention is weighted voting.4 Under
weighted voting, some countries receive more votes than other countries do. For
example, countries could receive votes in proportion to their population, their
wealth, their contribution to global public goods (represented by their UN
contributions), and other factors. Consider how population-weighted voting
might work. Every country could be given a vote for every one million in
population. China would then have 1,351 votes; India would have 1,237 votes;
and the United States would have 314 votes. The UK would have only 64 votes.
Many countries would have only one or two votes. As noted, voting could also
38
39

4

41

United States Census Bureau International Programs, Country Rank, http://www.census.gov/
population/international/data/countryrank/rank.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
Germany, for example, has higher per capita GDP than either the UK or France. See, GDP Per
Capita, PPP (Current International$), The World Bank (2014), available at http://data.worldbank.
Org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi data value_2012+wbapi data value+wbap
idata value-last&sort=desc (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
See UNGA Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Puestion of Equitable Representation on and
Increase in the Membership of the Security Counciland Other Matters related to the Secunity Council, UN Doc.
A/58/47 (Jan. 1, 2004).
Seefor example, Jonathan R. Strand & David P. Rapkin, Weighted Voting in the United Nations Security
Council A Simulation, 42 SIutIATION & GAMING 772 (2011).
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be based on wealth (in which case the United States would have the most votes),
UN contributions, or other factors.
An attractive feature of weighted voting is that it (very roughly) gives
countries votes in proportion to which a global public good affects them. If the
UN fails to prevent international conflict, then it might seem that more
populous countries would suffer more than less populous countries just because
the more populous countries contain more people who would suffer from the
ravages of war. Moreover, the larger and more powerful countries must
participate in the provision of any global public good, and so for this reason they
should have disproportionate voting power. In addition, because weighted
voting uses (or can use) majority rule, the risk of gridlock is diminished.
On the other hand, it could be argued that more populous countries would
suffer less because they are more powerful; they, in fact, do not need
international organizations as much as small countries, which depend on
international peace for trade and prosperity. And, as argued at the time of the
UN founding, the more powerful countries will refuse to participate in an
international organization when they do not have veto power. Under
population-weighting, China could outvote all other four members of the
Security Council; or if all countries were invited into the Security Council, then a
coalition consisting of China and India could outvote almost all the other 190+
countries in the world. So weighted voting may be worse than the current
system, or simply infeasible.
B. WTO
Formal voting rules in the WTO are complex and depend on the issue at
hand. Some decisions are taken by majority vote, some by two-thirds or threefourths vote, some by "consensus" (unanimity), and some are automatic barring
a consensus against them ("reverse consensus").42 A complete discussion of all
possible permutations is beyond the scope of this paper, and we will focus on
the procedures that predominate with respect to most decisions.
The evolution of WTO rules is best understood by considering the history
of its predecessor, GATT Article XXV of the original GATT, concerning "Joint
Action by the Contracting Parties," provided that decisions of the membership
would be taken by majority vote unless other parts of the Agreement provided
otherwise.4 3 Each GATT member had one vote." The same article allowed for
42

See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. IX.

43

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXV, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 UNTS 194 [hereinafter
GATI]. For the full text of the GATT Agreement and all other WTO treaty texts, see VTO Legal
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"waivers" of obligations if requested by a member when approved by a twothirds vote.4 5 Article XXX, concerning "Amendments," states that amendments
to Part I of GATT-which contains the most-favored nation obligation and the
negotiated tariff commitments-take effect only "upon acceptance by all
contracting parties."46 Amendments to other provisions of GATT (for example,
the national treatment obligation and rules on subsidies and antidumping
measures) take effect on acceptance of two-thirds of the contracting parties, but
only for the parties that accept the amendment. Likewise, under Article XXXV,
no member of GATT is obligated to accept another party as a member unless it
consents.47 Thus, a new member might be admitted to GATT under Article
XXXIII (by two-thirds vote), but an existing member might nevertheless decline
to extend the benefits of membership to the new member.4 8
At first blush, this structure suggests that at least some important changes
to GATT could come about by a simple majority vote under Article XXV.49
Changes that were neither amendments nor waivers could occur following only
a majority vote and seemingly would bind all members - an example might have
been a definitive interpretation of an existing but ambiguous obligation by the
contracting parties."
In fact, however, this problem never arose under GATT, because of the
implicit "repeat game" in the background. Any member could withdraw from
GATT, and so a member believing itself to be exploited could just quit.
Likewise, a member could simply deviate from its obligations and tell the rest of
the members to go soak their heads. The remaining members might retaliate by
deviating from their own obligations, in which case all pertinent parties would
effectively opt out and return to their pre-GATT trade policies. But those
policies were perceived to have been economically undesirable, and the
negotiated commitments of GATT were a joint improvement. Thus, no party
wanted to trigger a process by which GATT would unravel, and whatever
potential may have existed in principle for opportunistic use of the voting rules
was checked by the essentially self-enforcing nature of the bargain.
The general lesson here is that the voting rules in international
organizations are not always determinative of how its members will actually
behave and take decisions. This proposition is similar to the notion in the formal
44
45

46
47

48

49
o

GATT, supra note 43.
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Id. art. XXXV.
Id art. XXXIII.
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model of Maggi and Morelli that voting rules must be incentive compatible."
What their model obscures, however, is the fact that formal voting rules and
actual practice may diverge in such a way as to ensure incentive compatibility
regardless of the formal rules.
Hence, despite the formal voting rules under GATT, its history reveals a
steady and fairly rapid progression toward decision making by consensus on
most issues.52 This practice continues into the WTO Article IX of the Treaty
Establishing the WTO, concerning "Decision-Making," opens with the recital
that "[t]he WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus
followed under GATT.. . " Like GATT, however, it goes on to state that
decisions can be taken by majority vote failing consensus, unless otherwise
provided. Waivers now require a three-fourths majority, and any "amendment"
that "would alter the rights and obligations of the Members" is not binding on
any member that does not accept it. 53 "Interpretations" of obligations require
three-fourths approval.54 New members can join with two-thirds approval, but
no member is obligated to extend its obligations to the new member without
consent.
In the shadow of these rules, the WTO continues to operate by consensus
on most matters of major importance, and any "amendment" to "rights and
obligations" binds no member that does not consent." Members thereby
insulate themselves from the risk that their commitments will be measurably
altered through an adverse vote. The unsurprising result, as suggested by Section
I, is that the organization exhibits a considerable degree of paralysis with respect
to potentially valuable modifications in the treaty rules, and with respect to the
creation of new commitments. The now stalled Doha Round of negotiations
reflects this problem. We will return to this issue, but first consider another
aspect of the WTO that has been effectively removed from voting-dispute
resolution.
A member aggrieved by an alleged violation of the GATT/WTO treaty can
pursue a claim, pursuant to GATT Article XXIII and now the WTO Dispute
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See Maggi & Morelli, supra note 27.

52

See the discussion in
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WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. X.
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Id. art. XIII.

56

Id. art. X.
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Settlement Understanding (DSU), that benefits owing to it have been "nullified
or impaired."" Under the original GATT, absent a negotiated solution, the
contracting parties acting collectively were authorized to adjudicate the dispute
and, if "the circumstances are serious enough," they could pursuant to Article
XXIII authorize a complaining party to sanction a violator by suspending
appropriate trade concessions otherwise owed to the violator. Because of Article
XXV, a vote to allow sanctions in principle required only a bare majority.
But majority voting on dispute issues never came to pass, and again GATT
practice evolved toward consensus decision-making. The consensus rule became
a serious problem for the dispute resolution process. Until 1989, when the
members agreed on a rule change, a consensus had to exist before an arbitral
panel could be established to consider a claim that that the agreement had been
violated. After 1989 panels could be established as' a matter of right, but a
consensus was still required for the membership to "adopt" the findings of an
arbitral panel-adoption by the contracting parties was necessary before a
decision had legal force. Likewise, despite the nominal authority in Article XXIII
for sanctions to be authorized by majority vote, the understanding was that they
required consensus as well. 9 Collectively authorized sanctions accordingly
played no role in GATT.
Toward the end of GATT, the ability of disputants to block claims against
them grew into a significant problem, especially with respect to some
intransigent disputes between the United States and Europe. And because
collective sanctions were non-existent, aggrieved members (especially the United
States) began to "take the law into their own hands" by retaliating unilaterally
against practices alleged to violate GATT. 6o The situation was widely regarded as
unsatisfactory and, with the creation of the WTO, the members agreed to a
radical change in the dispute process. As under GATT, members can seek
arbitral panels as a matter of right, but their findings may be now be reviewed by
a standing Appellate Body." Most importantly, final decisions by adjudicators, as
modified on appeal, are automatically "adopted" and gain the force of law
absent a (reverse) consensus against their adoption (which would have to include
both the complainant and the respondent in the dispute). If a violator does not
cure the violation within a "reasonable period of time," the complaining nation
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Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1867 UNTS 154
[hereinafter WTO Dispute Resolution Understanding].
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for Section 301, 23 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 263 (1992).
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has a right to impose retaliation that cannot be blocked, subject to an arbitration
to ensure that its magnitude is commensurate with the violation. 62
The modern WTO thus presents a rather striking dichotomy. Significant
changes to obligations (outside of the dispute resolution process) require
something approaching unanimous consent as a practical matter. Yet, in the case
of a dispute over the meaning of an existing obligation, the membership
foregoes any opportunity to "vote" on the interpretation handed down by
adjudicators, as well as any opportunity to vote on an authorization for
sanctions.
This evolution, we suggest, is crudely explicable in relation to the
considerations developed in Section I. Entirely "new" obligations can take any
form, and members do not wish to be subject to dramatic changes in their
commitments without their own consent. The risks of other parties foisting joint
welfare-reducing obligations on the minority under a one-state-one-vote system
is simply too great. With regard to the obligations already in the agreement, and
to which unanimous consent has already been given, the potential for surprise
and opportunism is much less. Moreover, the costs of a dispute resolution
process that grinds to a halt if any party objects to it are considerable-disputed
legal issues never resolve, and the system devolves into unilateral retaliation with
a potential for escalating counter-retaliation. Arbitral panels can err, of course,
but the appellate process created under the WTO provides some check on
mistakes. The decision to create an automatic and "binding" dispute process
thus poses only a small threat of foisting an important and objectionable
obligation on a member that does not wish it.
Outside of the dispute settlement process, the consensus practice still
applies and, as noted, the consensus requirement makes it extremely difficult to
modify or add to basic treaty commitments. The problem has only grown has
WTO membership has expanded-from the original twenty-three members of
GATT in 1947 to 159 WTO members today.63 We have seen two types of
responses to the problem, neither entirely satisfactory.
The first response came at the creation of the WTO. Holdout issues were
significant, and some GATT members balked at some of the proposed new
commitments. In response, the major players agreed on a novel strategy-they
would formally withdraw from the GATT, and enter a new treaty creating the
WTO. 64 Any GATT member who wished to retain the benefits of GATT
62

These procedures are set forth in WTO Dispute Resolution Understanding, supra note 58, arts.
21-22.
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See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2014), http://www.wto.org/english/
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membership in relation to the major players had to do the same even if they did
not like aspects of the new WTO regime. Some members complained that the
process was coercive, but they had little choice but to capitulate."
The second response was seen before the creation of the WTO, and
remains an important feature of the international trade landscape presently. The
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in the 1970s, for example, yielded a
number of side agreements negotiated among subsets of GATT members-a
"Subsidies Code," a "Standards Code," and various others." These side
agreements bound only the signatories that elected to join them. Concurrently,
many GATT members pursued separate free trade agreements with other
nations (for example, NAFTA) that were completely separate from the GATT
system, pursuant to authority for such agreements contained in GATT Article
X

IV.67

More recently, in light of the apparent impasse in the WTO Doha
negotiations, the trend toward separate agreements with smaller numbers of
countries seems to be accelerating. The United States, in particular, is engaged in
a major Trans Pacific Partnership initiative along with a newer Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative. Within the WTO, the possibility of
sub-agreements ("plurilaterals") binding only a subset of members has again
been explored, particularly with reference to service sectors.
Thus, practice is once again evolving to address issues associated with
voting. Consensus decision-making protects against the oppression of the
majority, but creates holdout problems in negotiations that force concerned
nations to split off on their own. The result is not ideal, because agreements that
bind only some WTO members create obligations that are discriminatory against
non-signatories and that run the risk of inefficient trade diversion (whereby
production is diverted to less efficient nations that receive some form of trade
preference). Nevertheless, the general principle of consensus within the WTO
before important obligations can be modified, coupled with the opportunity for
nations to create sub-agreements or separate free trade agreements in response
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to holdouts, may be the best that the parties can do and may dominate any
changes in formal voting procedures.
C. International Monetary Fund and World Bank
Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank grew
out of the Bretton Woods conference at the end of World War II. They were
conceived simultaneously and are both lending institutions, so it is not surprising
that their voting rules and practices are quite similar. We take them together in
this section.
The IMF was created to oversee a system of fixed exchange rates.
Members initially agreed to "peg" their currencies to the dollar (i.e., maintain a
fixed relationship), while the United States agreed to peg the dollar to gold. 6 If
this system resulted in disequilibrium, whereby a nation found itself spending
down its foreign exchange reserves to support the value of its currency, the IMF
would lend reserves to that country.
The system was abandoned in 1971 when the United States faced a
shortfall of gold reserves and "closed the gold window," abandoning the fixed
relationship between gold and the value of the dollar. Within a few years the
fixed rate system of the IMF was replaced by a system in which most of the
major currencies "float"-their relative prices are determined by market forces.
Central banks still intervene at times in an effort to affect currency prices, but
they have no legal obligation to do so, and the major developed nations no
longer have any need to borrow from the IMF because they can borrow in
international capital markets. As a result, the function of the IMF has been
altered dramatically. Today, it serves as lender of last resort mostly to developing
countries and to a few others (such as Greece) that have encountered fiscal
problems so severe that they cannot borrow on reasonable terms in the capital
markets. Likewise, the major developed economies-originally expected to be
the potential borrowers from the IMF-now play the role of the major lenders.
They put up the capital that the IMF subsequently lends to nations in economic
trouble. We focus our discussion here on the voting rules of the IMF against the
backdrop of this modern function. n
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The formal voting system within the IMF entails "weighted voting"
pursuant to Article XII 5 5. Each member has the same number of "basic
votes," a tip of the hat to the one-state-one-vote system. But basic votes
comprise only a tiny percentage of total votes. Each member has additional
votes that are based on its allocation of "special drawing rights" (SDRs), a
reserve currency created by the IMF. The SDR allocation is tied to the member's
"quota," which represents the amount of currency that the member is obliged to
contribute to the IMF to support its lending operations (partly in a reserve
currency, and partly in its own currency). The quota is determined in accordance
with a rather complex and mysterious formula that takes account of various
measures of the size of each member's economy. The larger economies
contribute more resources to the IMF, receive more SDRs in return, and thus
have a larger number of votes. 7 At present, for example, the largest member
(the United States) holds approximately seventeen percent of the votes. The
smallest developing country member hold votes equal to a tiny fraction of one
percent. In addition, members that are active borrowers from the IMF have their
votes reduced.74

Different types of decisions are subject to different voting requirements.
Decisions on "investment" of funds require a seventy percent majority.
Decisions on most "amendments" to the IMF. Agreement require eighty-five
percent support," as do changes in a member's quota, along with the affected
member's consent." On the issues requiring an eighty-five percent vote, the
United States effectively has veto power (the only such country).
The governing body of the IMF is the Board of Governors, consisting of a
representative of each member empowered to cast that member's votes. The
Board of Governors meets occasionally, but the day-to-day operation of the
Fund is in the hands of the Executive Board, a professional body that is
appointed or elected by the members.7 The individuals on the Executive Board
are Executive Directors, and the chair is the Managing Director. The larger IMF
members have their own Executive Director. Smaller members band together to
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The articles of the International Monetary Fund may be found in JOHN H. JACKSON, WIu.IAM J.
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elect an Executive Director to represent them. The Executive Directors each
have voting power equal to the votes of the members they represent.
To appreciate the implications of such a system, one must understand the
issues that are subject to voting. The typical decision involves a request by a
member (say, Greece) for a loan (or "bailout" in the popular press). It is routine
under modern IMF practice for the IMF to require certain quid pro quo
arrangements in return for a loan (which, by the way, is invariably at below
market rates). These requirements are termed "IMF conditionality," and may
require a borrowing member, for example, to take fiscal measures to balance its
budget, or to reform some other aspect of its macroeconomic policies.
Negotiations between the IMF and the would-be borrower address these
matters, and the IMF will eventually settle on the amount that it is willing to lend
and the conditions that it wishes to impose. Such a matter would be classed as
an "investment" decision subject nominally to the seventy percent voting rule.
In fact, however, formal votes are rarely taken. Instead, the Executive
Board strives for consensus. 8 Negotiations generally proceed until all concerned
are satisfied. The Managing Director will continue the process until consensus
arises, or at least to the point that any apparent dissent could be outvoted in a
formal vote-the Managing Director thereby takes decisions based on the
"sense of the meeting." Despite the absence of formal voting, however,
everything proceeds in the shadow of the voting rules and may be presumed to
be consistent with the outcome that would arise if a formal vote were to be held.
Turning to the World Bank, it also serves as a lending institution, albeit
with a different focus. Originally conceived to aid in reconstruction after World
War II, the Bank now focuses exclusively on lending to promote
"development."" The borrowers are developing countries, and all members
contribute capital in relation to their economic capacity. The vast majority of the
capital comes from high-income members and larger middle-income countries
such as China, Brazil, Mexico, and so on. The typical issue that arises in the dayto-day operation of the Bank concerns which development projects to fund in
which countries, and the terms of the loans. Staff members develop
recommendations that proceed through channels to an Executive Board that
must ultimately approve loans, and may impose various conditions that are
somewhat akin to IMF conditionality. As with the IMF, loans are made at below
market rates out of Bank capital, or out of additional funds that the Bank can
borrow much more cheaply in the capital markets than the developing countries
78
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that receive the loans.
The formal decision-making process is so similar to that of the IMF that
we can be very brief. Weighted voting is used, based on each member nation's
"quota," the amount that it is required to provide to the Bank in lending
capital." Member quotas at the Bank are based on the same criteria as IMF
quotas. Each member has equal "basic votes," but the allocation of additional
votes based on quota means that the major lending nations have the bulk of the
votes. The so-called G-10 nations have about 50 percent of the votes, for
example. As with the IMF, formal votes are uncommon, and decisions are
instead based on the "sense of the meeting" as interpreted by the chair, with an
effort made to reach consensus. Nevertheless, members act in the shadow of the
voting rules and decisions are generally consistent with the outcome that voting
would produce: "Ultimately, the 'sense of the meeting' cannot but be reflective
of the respective voting powers of those who favour and those who oppose a
given proposal. . .. Voting power does determine each member's influence in
each decision. The fact that this structure doesn't have to be externalised in
formal voting on most occasions testified to its strength not to its
unimportance."'
Plainly, the effect of this system is to confer much of the leverage on the
larger, creditor nations at both the IMF and the Bank. This is hardly surprising.
As Margaret Thatcher famously remarked with particular reference to the IMF:
"There was no way in which I was going to put British deposits into a bank
which was totally run by those on overdraft."82
Lenders at both institutions wish to have reasonable confidence that loans
will be paid back, and that the subsidy they confer through a below-market loan
will go to some useful purpose. A high-minded purpose might be a desire to
create economic stability and prosperity in the global economy or to promote
economic growth in poor countries. Lender nations may also have more selfinterested reasons for loans, such as to reward or support an important strategic
ally, or to transfer resources to countries that owe money to their own banks and
may default absent international assistance. Whatever the underlying rationale
for subsidized lending, it comes as no surprise that creditors wish to retain
control over who can borrow and on what terms. Were the system designed
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otherwise, lenders would opt out or at least refuse to fund further borrowing,
and the institution would have no useful function to serve.
Nonetheless, the voting rules at both the IMF and the Bank have come
under extensive criticism in recent years, mainly from the standpoint of
developing countries, which argue that their interests are under-represented."
Because of such under-representation, the argument runs, IMF conditionality is
too restrictive and developing country borrowers do not receive as much benefit
from their loans as they should. Likewise, World Bank lending is thought to
favor certain nations with friendly ties to the major creditors, and to come with
conditions that are counterproductive.8 4 Various proposals have surfaced to
reduce the voting power of developed country lenders and strengthen the hands
of developing country borrowers. These include a modest reform in the voting
weights at the IMF in 2010 that was never implemented, and some modest
changes in voting weights at the Bank that were put into effect around the same
time. Despite the calls for reform, however, it seems that the major lenders are
not inclined to make any dramatic changes, and the balance of power remains
with them. This is unlikely to change significantly in the future.
D. The International Seabed Authority
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea regulates the oceans and the
other bodies of water that connect states." In addition to providing an elaborate
set of rules governing navigation rights, deep-seabed mining, and related
activities, the Convention sets up an international institution called the
International Seabed Authority, which has jurisdiction over mining-related
activities in the seabed.
The seabed contains valuable minerals. They currently cannot be extracted
in an economically viable way, but this may be possible in the future. Fearing
that mining companies will race to stake claims, resulting in conflicts over
property rights and overextraction, countries established the Authority to issue
regulations governing the mining of minerals, to issue licenses to mining
companies, and to supervise their activities. It was anticipated that the Authority
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would earn royalties from the licensing scheme, which would be redistributed to
the states.
The Authority is composed of two main bodies: the Assembly and the
Council." The relationship between the two bodies is somewhat ambiguous.
The Council is described as an executive agency but it also sets policy, which is
one of the functions given to the Assembly as well. The Council also issues
regulations governing seabed mining and evaluates and approves applications for
mining licenses. The Council proposes the budget, which the Assembly must
approve. The Assembly has authority to distribute financial benefits from the
Authority's activities, which may include royalties received from seabed miners.
The Assembly consists of delegates from every state that is a party to the
Convention. The Assembly makes procedural decisions by a simple majority of
states present and voting, and makes substantive decisions by two-thirds
supermajority. A 1994 Agreement subsequently provided that decisions
"should" be made by consensus, but it did not change the original voting rules."
The Assembly currently has 166 members (including the European Union,
which possesses one seat).
The Council has thirty-six members, who are elected by the Assembly. The
voting rules for the Council are complex. The original treaty provided that the
Council decides procedural questions by majority rule; questions relating to
communications and agreements among LOS bodies and UN organizations by a
two-thirds majority; policy questions, including certain financial questions, by a
three-fourths majority; and issues respecting the protection of developing
nations and the equitable distribution of profits by consensus."
These rules were amended in 1994 in order to address objections by the
United States." Under the amendment, two major changes were made. First, the
members of the Council are divided into four groups or "chambers": (1) four
members are states that are the largest consumers of the minerals of the type
derived from the seabed; (2) four members are states that have the largest
investments in deep seabed mining; (3) four members are states that export
minerals of the type derived from the seabed, two of which must be developing
states; and (4) twenty-four members are developing states, of which six are states
with other "special interests" (including states with large populations or are landlocked), and eighteen are states whose inclusion ensure an "equitable
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distribution" and regional representation." This, of course, implies that the
selection of members by the Assembly is subject to these constraints.
Second, the voting rule for all of the substantive decisions aside from the
provision governing division of resources was changed to two-third majority
provided that the majority of no chamber votes against the decision. Effectively,
this means that all decisions require a majority or tie vote in each chamber, plus
two-thirds of all members in the aggregate.
The Authority was set up to solve a classic public good problem-the
problem of overexploitation of a common pool. By giving the Authority the
power to control access through a licensing system, states enable it to prevent
overexploitation, while giving it the discretion to react to changes in technology,
scientific knowledge, demand and supply, and so on. But this discretion also
gives the Authority the power to favor some states over others. It could be used
in many ways: most explicitly, to distribute royalties to favored states, but also
(for example) to delay or deny license applications so as to avoid harming
exporting countries, to demand high royalties from mining companies which
would harm the countries in which the mining companies are located, and so on.
To address these problems, the states used a series of majority and
supermajority rules of increasing severity. In both the Assembly and the Council,
majority rule was available for procedural decisions; supermajority rules were
used for substantive decisions.92 The variation in the level of the supermajority
can be explained in the following way. Because procedural decisions rarely have
a direct impact on substantive outcomes, they will rarely threaten the interests of
any particular state, and thus cannot by themselves be used to effect major
wealth transfers from one state to another. The weakest rule-majority rulethus minimizes gridlock without exposing any state to significant risk of
expropriation.
States established the Assembly to ensure that all states have a voice in
decisions but the major decision-making authority was lodged in the Council.
The Assembly's use of two-thirds supermajority rule for substantive decisions
ensures that a small majority cannot expropriate from minorities but does allow
a supermajority to expropriate from a small minority-as could happen, for
91

In 2013, the members of the council corresponding to the groups numbered in the text were: (1)
China, Italy, Japan, Russia; (2) France, Germany, Italy, South Korea; (3) Australia, Chile, Canada,
South Africa; (4) Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, Fiji, Jamaica, Uganda; (5) Mozambique, Argentina,
Cameroon, Indonesia, Cote d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Guyana, Kenya, Mexico, Namibia,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Sri Lanka, Senegal, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom,
Vietnam. Composition of the Coundl, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY, http://www.isa.org.jm/
en/about/members/council/composition (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). The United States is not a
member of the Authority because it never ratified the treaty.

92

UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 159 § 8 and art. 161

Summer 2014

§ 8(a)-(d).

219

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

example, if poor states gang up on rich states. But that will not happen because
any major decision must be taken by the Council, which is set up to minimize
the risk of expropriation.
The original treaty provided that the Council would use supermajority rules
of increasing severity, and it is evident that the scheme reflects the danger that
purely distributive decisions pose to states." Communications-which are
unlikely to harm anyone-require a supermajority of two thirds. General policy
decisions, which involve a mix of efficiency and distributive issues, pose greater
harm, and thus require a greater supermajority of three fourths. The purely
distributional decisions require a consensus. There is logic to this scheme: as the
decision becomes more purely distributional, the risk of expropriation increases
while the cost of inefficient gridlock-in the sense of lost opportunities to
exploit resources-declines.
To illustrate, consider two decisions. The first is whether to grant a license
to an American mining company. Congo objects to the license because it fears
that mining will reduce the price of a commodity it exports. It is imaginable that
other developing companies would line up with Congo out of solidarity but if
they do so, they also lose the opportunity for a share of the royalties. The twothirds majority rule gives the developing companies some power to extract
concessions but it is unlikely to block licenses. The second is how to distribute
royalties. It is easy to imagine that developing countries would argue that all
royalties should be distributed to them because they are poor. The consensus
rule enables the rich countries to block such a decision. The strict decision rule
may make it difficult to reach a decision, but gridlock does not block any
efficient outcomes in this case. Eventually, the wealth will be distributed and the
cost of delay in the meantime will be relatively low-just the difference between
any interest that can be earned on the money and the foregone time value of the
money. Note that the small size of the Council-relative to the Assembly-also
reduces the risk of gridlock because bargaining is easier in small groups,
although by the same token it also raises the risk that some countries will be
frozen out of negotiations and able to affect outcomes only by threatening to
form a blocking coalition in the Assembly.
The 1994 agreement gave the United States near-veto power by assuring it
that it would belong to a chamber with three other similarly situated countries
and the ability to block decisions as long as it could obtain the support of two of
those other three. 94 It is not clear why this system did not satisfy the United
States but one reason may be that the US government believes that agreement
will be so hard to reach that it will become impossible to exploit the seabed
9
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resources, in which case overexploitation may be a less bad outcome than nonexploitation. On the other hand, a weaker voting system might force the United
States to share revenues more than it is willing to do, given its presumed
technological and economic advantages. It is puzzling that a deal cannot be
reached given that the all countries have an interest in the efficient exploitation
of resources but an explanation may be that since it is not yet economically
feasible to extract those resources, the US government has a strong interest in
holding out for a better deal.
E. European Union
Voting within the European Union follows highly complex rules that
depend on exactly who is doing the voting (the European Commission or the
Parliament) and what issues are on the table. The voting rules sometimes depend
on whether the staff of the European Commission (the central bureaucratic arm
of the EU) has proposed the policy or not (the voting rule requires less support
for Commission proposals in some areas). Moreover, the voting rules have
changed at many points in time with successive EU treaties. A complete account
of the rules, much less a theoretical treatment of all the subtle differences and
changes over time, is well beyond what we can provide in this brief
contribution." Instead, we focus on a few key features of the system that
highlight issues noted in Section I.
As the EU has expanded to a total of twenty-seven members through the
years, a recurring tension arises between the interests of the larger and smaller
countries. The larger economies (especially Germany, France, the United
Kingdom and Italy) wish to maximize their influence and have a reasonable
claim to greater influence based on their larger populations and GDP The
smaller countries, however, do not wish to be at the mercy of the larger
countries and have sought voting power to protect their interests. The familiar
problems from Section I arise in this setting-as each member gains power
through a voting rule that approaches unanimity, it becomes more and more
difficult to make policy decisions. Also, each member's participation constraint
must be satisfied. Large countries will not submit themselves to a prospect of
being outvoted by a majority of small countries (particularly as many of the
smaller countries have lower per capita incomes and somewhat different
interests), while smaller countries are not willing to cede all the power to the
large countries.
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No simple solution to the challenges exists, which no doubt explains why
the details of the voting rules keep changing with time and with the expansion of
the union. The current voting rules, which remain in effect until 2014 under the
Treaty of Nice," involve two key dimensions. The first involves a number of
issue areas (such as collective security policy, and tax harmonization) with
respect to which policy changes require unanimity. These may be viewed as the
most important issues on which each member wishes to retain a veto. For a
range of other, less sensitive issue areas, the rule is qualified majority voting.
Under the Treaty of Nice, voting in the Council on the issues that do not require
unanimity requires three conditions to be satisfied: the measure must be
supported by a majority of member states (one-state-one vote) if proposed by
the Commission, or two-thirds if not proposed by the Commission; the measure
must receive at least seventy-four percent of the weighted votes; and it must be
supported by members comprising sixty-two percent of the population of the
EU. Weighted voting is based on negotiated voting power, which gives the four
largest countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy) twenty-nine votes each, Spain
and Poland twenty-seven votes each, with lesser weights for the smaller
countries (Malta has only three). This system prevents a group of the larger
countries from pushing through policies over the objection of a large number of
smaller countries, while giving the larger countries considerable power to block
initiatives if they band together. At the same time it avoids the possible gridlock
of unanimity rules.
The Treaty of Lisbon, which takes effect in 2014 (with a transition period
through 2017), tweaks this system. It eliminates the voting weights, and instead
provides that policy changes subject to qualified majority voting must have the
support of fifty-five percent of the EU member states (if proposed by the
Commission, seventy-two percent otherwise), and the support of states
representing sixty-five percent of the population of the EU Further, if the
second condition is not met, the proposal can still go through unless at least four
members vote against the proposal. The latter change prevents a group of three
large countries from blocking policy changes, and in that sense represents a
modest concession by the larger members to the smaller members.
Another important change under the Treaty of Lisbon involves a
substantial reduction in the number of subject areas that require unanimity.
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Immigration and asylum policy initiatives, for example, and intellectual property
initiatives, will require only a qualified majority. As the voting rule in the Council
has moved toward qualified majority in more and more issue areas, however, the
role of the European Parliament has expanded. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the
so-called "ordinary legislative procedure," also termed the co-decision
procedure, under which initiatives must be approved by both the Council and
the Parliament, becomes more predominant." This procedure somewhat
resembles the bicameral process in the United States, in which both the House
and the Senate must approve legislation, with differences resolved in a
conference committee. The EU co-decision procedure does not apply in all issue
areas, however, such as taxation, where the unanimity requirement survives in
the Council. But to a significant degree, unanimity requirements in the Council
are being replaced with a co-decision procedure that requires non-unanimous
approval in both the Council and the Parliament.
The movement away from unanimity has its roots in a desire to promote
greater policy flexibility. But the enhanced role of Parliament limits the
importance of that change. In addition, the Parliament is directly elected and
thus contains more representation of minority viewpoints than the Council,
where the members are representatives of the government in power in each
member state. The Parliament thus allows minority viewpoints within member
states to have greater influence on policy.
F. Committees, Commissions, Councils, and Courts
Many international organizations use simple majority rule. We can divide
them into two groups. First, a huge number of committees, commissions,
councils, and organizations of other types have the power to make
recommendations, collect and analyze information, issue non-legally binding
interpretations of the law, and launch investigations. These organizations are
especially common in the area of human rights, but also include (among many
others) the International Labor Organization and the World Health
Organization. Second, there are a large number of courts and arbitral bodiesincluding the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court,
and the WTO dispute settlement system-which use majority rules in order to
resolve cases. These courts have the power to issue legally binding judgments.
What explains the prevalence of majority rule in these organizations? The
simplest explanation for the first group is that because they cannot issue legally
binding orders, their impact on states is minimal, and thus states need not worry
that they will cause significant harm. Thus, these organizations follow the model
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of the General Assembly, which also does not have the power to issue legally
binding orders.
As for the second group, while courts can issue legally binding orders,
states can almost always escape their jurisdiction by refusing to consent to it.
And the powers of international courts tend to be highly limited. For example,
the WTO can only authorize countries to erect trade barriers in retaliation, and
this is not a remedy that small countries can effectively use against large
countries. One possible reason for the ubiquity of majority rule for courts is that
(outsider international criminal law and the WTO) judicial or arbitral
proceedings usually commence only with the consent of both states, and
supermajority rule, weighted voting, or any other system aside from majority rule
would give the advantage to one state, eliminating the incentive of the other
state to consent to legal process.
IV. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: QUADRATIC VOTING
Our discussion so far raises the obvious question of whether a superior
voting system may improve the functioning of international organizations. As
we have seen, the problem with existing voting systems is that they do not
guarantee efficient outcomes. This may make countries reluctant to enter
international organizations or give them substantial powers. Thus, an interesting
hypothesis is that the weakness of international organizations is not (or not
entirely) due to the anarchical condition of international relations, mistrust
among countries, or power-related considerations, but the absence of a system
that can reliably translate countries' hidden preferences into efficient outcomes.
In a recent paper, the economist Glen Weyl proposes a voting system,
which he argues will cause a group to produce optimal collective decisions."
Called "quadratic voting," this system provides that every member of the group
has the right to buy as many votes as they want for or against a proposal, paying
a price equal to the square of the number of votes they buy. The proposal is
accepted if a majority of votes are in favor of it; the money that is collected is
returned to group members on a pro rata basis-meaning that each of the n
members of the group receive a 1/n share.
The system is designed to force voters to internalize the cost of their
voting on third parties. When a person buys a vote, she estimates the probability
that it will flip the outcome in her favor (that is, that she is the pivotal voter),
and multiplies that probability by the amount in which the outcome benefits her.
Typically, each additional vote she buys will improve her well-being, in an
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expected sense, by an equal amount. The quadratic pricing forces her to pay an
amount that increases linearly (and therefore proportionately) with the amount
in which the expected outcome benefits her. If everyone votes in this way, then
the number of votes cast in favor of an outcome will be proportionate to the
amount a person is willing to pay for that outcome-for example, a person who
cares twice as much will buy twice the votes. Majority rule then ensures that the
people who collectively care the most prevail over people who do not, even if
the former group is numerically smaller than the latter group.'
In the context of our discussion of the defects of voting rules used by
international organizations, the important thing to see is that quadratic voting
enables voters with strong preferences (who thus face high exploitation costs) to
vote more than voters with weak preferences, unlike the various voting rules we
have discussed. At the same time, it prevents countries with strong preferences
from dictating outcomes when enough countries with weak preferences oppose
them.
Could quadratic voting be used by international organizations? The
theoretical case would be strong. Countries would be able to exert influence in
proportion to the intensity of their preferences, leading to efficient decisions. In
the case of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), for example, a country that
gained a great deal from mining operations and a country whose export industry
would be severely injured by them, could both exert more influence on the
outcome than countries that are indifferent as to whether the operations went
forward or not. Meanwhile, gridlock would be impossible because no country
exercises a veto. Similarly, the WTO would be able to move forward with
additional trade-barrier reductions.
There are a number of possible objections to quadratic voting. First,
countries may object to money playing a role in the decisions of international
bodies. However, money already plays an influence in the IMF and World Bank,
and everyone understands that rich countries have greater influence in every
other body, from the United Nations to the WTO These bodies could not
function without the disproportionate monetary contributions of the rich
countries. Nor could they produce meaningful outcomes unless rich countries
agreed to comply with their decisions. Thus, in one way or another, the bodies
disproportionately reflect the interests of rich, powerful countries, or they fail to
function. Quadratic voting merely formalizes this influence and in this way
ensures that outcomes are more efficient and predictable than they currently are,
which benefits rich countries and poor countries alike. That said, if money is an

100 More detailed explanations can be found in Weyl, supra note 99; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl,
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insurmountable objection, then an artificial currency could be used, with
distributions to countries based on equality or another fair norm.
Second, the unfamiliarity of quadratic voting may make states reluctant to
use it. This is certainly a reasonable objection, but it is also worth keeping in
mind that the voting rules already in existence are pretty strange and elaborate.
The byzantine voting rules used by the ISA are a case in point, andeare just a
highly inefficient way of approximating the outcomes-allowing efficient
decisions while blocking exploitation-that quadratic voting achieves more
directly.
Third, one might argue that countries get along fine with ordinary voting
rules in their domestic politics; thus, it is unlikely that they would be necessary
for foreign organizations. But the voting rules used in domestic politics create
endless problems, especially gridlock, which results from the frequent use of
supermajority rules and other protections for minorities. In the United States,
the judiciary has become deeply involved in politics in order to protect
minorities from majority rule, and many political decisions have been delegated
from a frequently paralyzed Congress to the executive branch precisely because
the executive branch is a unitary institution that does not need to use voting
rules in order to make decisions. But these workarounds cannot be used
internationally where there is greater distrust across countries and weak
institutions. States have generally resisted proposals to delegate significant power
to international judges and other officials; when they create international
organizations, they give them limited powers.
A fourth concern is roughly the antithesis of the first - that money will not
be the determining force in voting outcomes in accordance with the quadratic
scheme. Influential countries might "buy" votes through all manner of under the
table promises of aid, diplomatic favors and the like, thereby avoiding the need
to pay money equal to the square of the number of votes purchased. The
efficiency of the voting outcome is then undermined. Whether this problem
would prove more serious than the imperfections with current voting
mechanisms, where votes can also be "bought," however, is anyone's guess.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to produce useful generalizations about optimal international
voting systems from international organizations' experiences with different
voting rules, but a few thoughts may be warranted.
One point concerns the different design choices that states have made. We
can identify several different dimensions: (1) one-state-one-vote versus weighted
voting where different states have a different number of votes; (2) the strength
of the voting rule, ranging from majority rule, through various supermajority
rules, to consensus; (3) cameralism, or the clustering of states with similar
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interests into different bodies that must separately approve a resolution; (4)
variation in the scope of the authority of the voting body-regarding whether it
can make a legally binding decision or not, and the importance of the decision
that it is permitted to make; and (5) different voting rules or procedures for
different types of decisions-procedural versus substantive, for example. Voting
bodies with more authority under (4) tend to have stricter voting rules under (2)
and (3), and weighted voting favoring more powerful states under (1).
Our other main point concerns the factors underlying the choice of voting
rule-decision costs, exploitation costs, heterogeneity, and discount factors. Our
examples suggest a few patterns. When international organizations are given
substantial authority, the risk of exploitation rises, and so states protect
themselves by agreeing to stronger voting rules; related, the risk of noncompliance also rises, and thus a strong voting rule may be needed to ensure
compliance. When international organizations are large, and thus decision costs
are high, the voting rule should be weaker, all things equal. But all things are
rarely equal. A larger body will usually be more heterogeneous, and will typically
involve states with weaker institutions and hence lower discount factors. These
considerations will push in favor of stricter voting rules. A body that is large,
homogenous, and consisting of only developed states should have weaker voting
rules; the EU seems like an apt illustration.
Heterogeneity can also be addressed with cameralism. The distinctive
feature of cameralism is that it blocks decisions that would produce significant
variance in payoffs for states while maintaining low decision costs when variance
is low. The problem is that cameralism can block such outcomes even when
those outcomes are desirable for the group as a whole.
We can distinguish heterogeneity-where different states receive different
payoffs from a particular decision by a body-and asymmetry, which may be
used to refer to cases where a few states identified in advance of the
determination of the voting rule can be expected to repeatedly receive payoffs
different from the other states. These special states are usually the richest and
most powerful states, which are (paradoxically) a tempting target for exploitation
by the majority. When a group of states needs a small number of rich or
powerful states to join them in an international organization, they will need to
assure the larger states that they will not be exploited in the sense of being
continually outvoted and hence deprived of the benefits of joining. Weighted
voting in favor of the large states is the most obvious solution to this problem.
States always retain the power to exit international organizations; this exit
option may compensate them for lack of voting power. When a majority or
supermajority can outvote a minority, the majority may refrain from doing so
because the organization will fail if the minority exits. This phenomenon may
explain not only the widespread use of strict voting rules, as Maggi and Morelli
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argue, but also the frequency with which states ignore the de jure voting rules
that govern an organization and work by consensus instead.
Reform of voting rules in international organizations has been hampered
by the absence of a consensus on how best to design voting rules to ensure
efficient decisions. Our brief discussion of quadratic voting suggests that an
optimal design of voting rules-one that takes into account the intensity of
preferences as well as the number of countries that back or oppose an
outcome-may exist, and that the prevailing voting rules fall far short of the
optimal. Whether quadratic voting itself is a realistic reform proposal is best left
for future work.
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